More noticeably, if primary budget deficit to
GDP ratio increases by one percentage point
from the benchmark scenario, it will cause
overall budget deficit to GDP ratio to rise by
1.0 percentage points per year, and public debt
will reach 91.5% of GDP in 2020. Even if the
government succeeds to maintain its annual
primary budget balanced, an overall budget
deficit may still occur because of interest payments and domestic currency depreciation. In
this scenario, public debt will remain at
approximately 55% of GDP in 2020, a circumstance that will never happen given the current
levels of government revenue and expenditure.
The prospects of Vietnam’s public debt convey a clear message. In order to maintain a stable public debt to GDP ratio, besides triggering
high inflation, the government must be able to
control a balanced primary budget. Given the
country’s current high level of revenue to GDP
ratio, the job can only be done through public
spending contraction.
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Journal of Economics and Development Vol.13, No.3, December 2011, pp. 5 - 23 ISSN 1859 0020
Public Debt of Vietnam:
Risk and Challenges
Pham The Anh
National Economics University, Vietnam
Email: pham.theanh@neu.edu.vn
Abstract
The paper aims to analyse risks and challenges of Vietnam’s public debt. The
analysis is a combination of statistical description and numerical simulation. It
basically shows that the public debt sustainability and liquidity are still below the
conventional safety thresholds but the macroeconomic conditions are quickly dete-
riorating as a result of the recent highly-rising public debt. Given the Vietnamese
government’s targets, the benchmark scenario implies that Vietnam’s public debt to
GDP ratio will consistently increase to around 65% in 2015 and then 82% in 2020.
Facing increasing risks of high public debt and limited potential revenue sources,
the only way for the government to avoid an explosive path of public debt is to
reduce public spending seriously and persistently.
Keywords: Public debt, macroeconomic volatility, Vietnam
JEL Classification: E60, E62 and E66
Journal of Economics and Development 5 Vol. 13, No.3, December 2011
1. Introduction also be divided into domestic and external
The Vietnamese economy has probably debt. (External debt is the amount of debts in
been experiencing the hardest time since its foreign currencies through bilateral or multi-
renovation (Doi Moi) started in the early lateral arrangements, or through international
1990s. The recent global economic crisis has financial markets.) The fiscal situation and the
revealed many shortcomings of the economy performance of the economy are closely relat-
which had been enjoying high growth regard- ed through a number of vital macroeconomic
less of its long term stability. Economic variables. A prolonged budget deficit will
growth slowed down while prices increased finally result in a high level of internal public
dramatically. Furthermore, macroeconomic debt. Meanwhile, external public debt is main-
imbalances such as the trade deficit and public ly caused by the deficiency in national savings.
debt continued to increase, threatening the A rapid growth of public debt may limit the
country’s sustainable growth and stability. effects of monetary, fiscal, and exchange rate
Vietnam, like many other developing coun- policies.
tries, has a high demand for loans in order to Government budget deficit is defined as the
implement various socio-economic projects. gap between total expenditure and total rev-
There are many reasons for policy makers to enue in a given period. Meanwhile, public debt
be tempted by the prospect of vast borrowing is computed by accumulating these deficits
programs. The loans may be used to finance over many years. Statistics on Vietnam’s pub-
public infrastructure to improve the economy’s lic debt are very inconsistent. Different
capacity, to invest in health and education to sources report different data. In recent years,
raise human capital and long run growth, or to data from the Ministry of Finance (MoF) of
temporarily loosen fiscal policies in response Vietnam showed a surprising similarity
to a cyclical recession. However, the conse- between actual and projected figures. In partic-
quences of the public debt crises that happened ular, both the actual and projected state budget
in emerging markets during 1990s and in deficit always fluctuated slightly around 5% of
Europe recently are good lessons for the coun- GDP except for 2009 when Vietnam imple-
try to be careful with its budgetary decisions. mented its stimulus package to escape from the
In this paper, we first attempt to evaluate the economic recession. However, the above fig-
current situation of Vietnam’s public debt and ures reported by the MoF were very different
consequently point out its potential risks. We from those by international agencies such as
then discuss the relationship between public the Asian Development Bank (ADB) or the
debt and other important macroeconomic indi- International Monetary Fund (IMF). For
cators such as growth and inflation. Finally, we example, in 2009 the budget deficit reported
give some predictions of Vietnam’s public debt by the MoF was 6.9%, which was far below
in the next ten years. 7.7% and 8.9% reported by the ADB and the
IMF respectively. Together with the differ-
2. Data inconsistency ences in budget deficit figures were the differ-
According to the law on public debt man- ences in public debt statistics. Despite the
agement that came into effect on 1st January inconsistency, both the MoF and the IMF cur-
2010, Vietnam’s public debt is defined as gov- rently reported an increasing trend of
ernment debt, government guaranteed debt, Vietnam’s public debt to go over 55% of GDP.
and municipal debt. The total public debt can The data inconsistencies mainly came from
Journal of Economics and Development 6 Vol. 13, No.3, December 2011
Vietnam’s strange accounting norms which are external debt and external public debt were
very different from international standards. around 30% and 25% of GDP respectively.
Firstly, they counted principal payments as They have correspondingly jumped to over
part of total expenditure and hence contributed 40% and 30% of GDP by the end of 2010,
to the budget deficit. In contrast, some of the delivering a warning signal on public debt
expenditure funded by government bond management of Vietnam.
issuance, on projects in education, health,
3. Public debt evaluation
water resources, etc., was not included in the
budget deficit. Furthermore, spending on big Following the debt crisis in the 1980s and
and prolonged projects was recorded into the 1990s, there was intensive research on deter-
state budget based on its disbursement, not on minants of a sovereign debt crisis and various
the amount of bonds issued. The inconsistent attempts to build early warning models. For
data caused some noise for market partici- example, Reinhart (2002) found that about
pants. It also created hurdles for international 84% of the countries in his sample had been in
comparison, monitoring, and managing the a debt crisis following a monetary crisis.
nation’s public debt. Therefore, economic indicators used for pre-
There is a similarity between Vietnam’s sta- dicting monetary crises were also suitable for
tistics on total external and external public debt crisis forecasts. In addition, Catão and
debt. Although there is a gap between figures Sutton (2002) argued that the volatility of
from different sources, all show a rapidly monetary policy, fiscal policy, and exchange
increasing trend. At the end of 2008, total rates also played an important role for trigger-
Table 1: Budget Deficit and Public Debt in Vietnam
Unit: %GDP
Source: MoF, IMF, and ADB
Journal of Economics and Development 7 Vol. 13, No.3, December 2011
Table 2: External Debt in Vietnam
Unit: %GDP
Source: MoF, IMF, and ADB
Table 3: External Public Debt in Vietnam
Unit: %GDP
Source: MoF and IMF
ing crisis risks. Based on Manasse and Roubini warning signals before a sovereign debt crisis.
(2005), in this section, we carry out evaluation Their work showed that most crises occurred
on Vietnam’s public debt via some measures: due to: (i) insolvency (because of high levels
(i) solvency, e.g. public debt and external pub- of debt and hyperinflation); (ii) illiquidity and;
lic debt as a fraction of GDP; (ii) liquidity, e.g. (iii) economic recession and currency overval-
short term public debt and debt service as a uation. Their model successfully identified
fraction of foreign reserves and; (iii) volatility warning signals that arose before a crisis. In
of economic growth, inflation, current account other words, the probability of failure to pre-
dict a crisis before it actually happened, the
balance, and exchange rates.
type I errors, was very small. However, the
Some key indicators of Vietnam’s public probability of false alarms, the type II errors,
debt and macroeconomic conditions are pre- was higher than desirable. Although there were
sented in Table 4. Thresholds are taken from certain limits, the paper was relatively compre-
Manasse and Roubini (2005). In their paper, hensive and successful in providing warning
Manasse and Roubini (2005) employed a new signals before sovereign debt crises.
statistical method to systematically examine Therefore, thresholds given by Manasse and
Journal of Economics and Development 8 Vol. 13, No.3, December 2011
Roubini (2005) will be used to make a compar- equals or exceeds net present value of its debt.
ison with corresponding indicators of Vietnam. Similarly, a nation is solvent in external debt if
This helps obtain a more precise overview of the discounted value of its future trade bal-
the current public debt situation and macro- ances is greater than the net present value of
economic prospects of the country. foreign debt. Hence examining budget and
3.1. Solvency trade balances is very important to evaluating
Solvency reflects debt sustainability of a solvency of a country’s public debt. Persistent
country. It depends on the stock of debt, com- budget and trade deficits will accumulate to
pared with the ability to pay, measured by the current stock of debt. Currency overvalua-
GDP, exports, or government revenue. A coun- tion might result in trade imbalance and exter-
try is solvent in public debt if the discounted nal debt. In contrast, a high GDP growth rate
value of its future primary budget balances will raise the ability to pay debt.
Table 4. Some Selected Indicators on Public Debt, 2005 – 2010 (%)
Source: The author’s calculation from the MoF’s public debt data and the ADB’s economic data
Journal of Economics and Development 9 Vol. 13, No.3, December 2011
An investigation on Vietnam’s public debt In addition, Vietnam’s public debt to total
solvency implies that, by the end of 2010, the budget revenue ratio is also rising rapidly. In
public debt-to-GDP, external debt to GDP, and particular, by the end of 2010, total public debt
external public debt to GDP ratios were over was about double of the total budget revenue,
55%, 40%, and 30% respectively. It is hard to up from 1.6 times in 2008. Meanwhile, state
say whether they went over safety levels, since budget remains in deep deficit in the last few
different research produced different warnings years and there are no signs of improvement
for different countries. For example, Li et al in the near future. State budget projections
(2010) pointed out that Eastern European and imply that the government will continue to
Central Asian countries were normally in carry out expansionary fiscal policies with
crises with their external debt to GDP ratio annual budget deficit of approximately 5% of
surging to highs between 42% and 88%. GDP. As a consequence, the public debt to
Meanwhile, low and lower middle income GDP ratio will certainly not halt at the current
countries fell into crises with a much lower level of around 57%.
ratio. External and external public debt in
3.2. Liquidity
these economies before crises occurred
accounted for less than 40% of GDP. However, Liquidity measures a country’s capacity to
it is noticeable that Vietnam’s solvency situa- pay debt in the short term. It is normally calcu-
tion has been deteriorating rapidly in recent lated as the ratio of short term external debt
years. According to the MoF statistics, within and/or external debt service over reserves or
two years, from 2008 to 2010, its public debt exports. Since over 80% of the external public
to GDP ratio rose by over 20 percentage debt is long term with preferential interest
points, from 36.2% to 57.3%, while the exter- rates, Vietnam faces almost no liquidity risk. Its
nal public debt to GDP ratio also went up over short term external public debt to reserves ratio
6 percentage points, from 25.1% to above is approximately 20% while the external public
31.1%. The increasing trend clearly threatens debt service to reserves ratio is just below 10%.
Vietnam’s financial safety and the country The figures were well under the safety thresh-
needs to respond in a timely fashion. old warned by international agencies.
Figure 1: Debt Service in 2011 – 2023
Source: The author’s calculation from the MoF and Bloomberg data
Journal of Economics and Development 10 Vol. 13, No.3, December 2011
Domestic public debt service is computed economy was probably its relatively rapid
based on the amount of existing government growth despite the context of the global crisis.
and government guaranteed bonds. In addition, solvency and liquidity measures
Meanwhile, external public debt was taken were still below safety thresholds. However,
from the External Debt Report No. 7 by the after years of pursuing high growth, mainly
MoF. It can be seen that, from 2011 to 2013, through demand expansion, the country’s eco-
most of the government’s debt service will be nomic prospects deteriorated faster than
paid to domestic creditors. The total amount in expected. Within the last three years, the
the next three years will be around 215 trillion growth rate slowed down remarkably and is
VND (over USD10 billion). The figure is unlikely to get back to the level before even
equivalent to more than 40% of the total state when the global crisis ends.
budget revenue in 2010 and roughly equals In recent years, Vietnam’s current account
Vietnam’s present foreign reserves. Currently, deficit has rocketed to roughly 10% of GDP,
the large amount of domestic public debt plus causing persistent depreciation of the home
large annual budget deficit will put more pres- currency. From the beginning of 2010 to the
sure on monetary policy and inflation in the first quarter of 2011, the Dong depreciated
coming times. around 20% against the U.S. dollar. At the
External public debt service is relatively sta- same time, prolonged budget imbalance and
ble over time. In the next three years, on aver- high money growth rates have made inflation
age, Vietnam will pay about VND 32 trillion spiral out of control. Specifically, since the
(USD 1.5 billion) in forms of interests and beginning of 2008, Vietnam’s consumer price
principal each year. The number is just above index has gone up by nearly 75%. Currently,
10% of the country’s current reserves. the government bond rate has been over 12% -
Nevertheless, prolonged trade deficit is threat- a phenomenon that often appears before a debt
ening to deplete its reserves and weakening crisis.
liquidity in the long run. Vietnam has been consistently downgraded
3.3. Macroeconomic volatility by international agencies due to its macro
The most positive signal from Vietnam’s instability. The credit default swap (CDS)
Figure 2: Credit Default Swap on G-Bonds by Selected Countries, 2006 – 2010
Source: Bloomberg
Journal of Economics and Development 11 Vol. 13, No.3, December 2011
rates, measuring the government bond risk in Vietnamese bore a tax over income rate from
international markets, has surged and stayed 1.4 to 3 times higher than other Asian coun-
high during the last few years. On the contrary, tries due to severe trade protectionism and tax
other regional countries’ CDS index has been overlaps. Raising taxes and fees to narrow the
falling since the early 2009. Vietnam’s eco- country’s budget deficit is clearly limited.
nomic prospects have become less appealing
Further analysis of the state revenue compo-
to international investors. Perhaps, it is right
nents in the past five years shows that about
time for Vietnam to put aside its desire for
short term high growth to settle economic two thirds of total state revenue come from
instability. three main types of taxes, namely value added
tax (VAT, 23%), corporate income tax (CIT,
4. Revenue analysis
30%), and tariff (13%). The rising trend in tar-
Total government revenue is one of the indi- iff revenue, from 9% in 2006 to 17% in 2009
cators used to assess the solvency of public and 14% in 2010 shows, on the one hand, a
debt. Due to its importance and unique charac-
rapid development of international trade; on
teristics, we conduct a deep examination on
the other hand, high trade protection. The
the risk of revenue sources. To maintain an
annual balanced budget, thereby reducing the heavy dependence on this revenue source may
public debt to GDP ratio, a government has cause a more serious budget deficit since
two choices: either cutting spending or Vietnam has to follow its tariff cut route as
increasing revenue. Public spending, to a cer- committed to the WTO in the coming years.
tain extent, can be controlled immediately just Moreover, as in a typical low-income coun-
by tightening which is very likely to be sup- try, Vietnam’s individual income tax (IIT)
ported by the public. By contrast, raising rev- accounts for only a small proportion (3-4%) of
enue is probably much more difficult due to the total revenue and, in contrast to CIT, it
limited revenue sources, and of course tends to increase in recent years. In addition,
receives no support from businesses as well as special consumption tax on domestically pro-
other tax payers in the economy. duced goods (SCT) accounts for 6% of the
According to the ADB statistics, on average, total revenue and is also on an increasing
Vietnam’s annual government revenue exclud- trend. More noticeably, revenue from land use-
ing grants in the previous decade reached right assignment and state-owned house sales
25.3% of GDP. Out of it, revenue from taxes is declining in both absolute size and propor-
and fees accounted for 21.5% of GDP, much tion of the total budget revenue as these assets
higher than any other regional countries. In have been gradually depleted. Many econo-
particular, the ratio stood at 15% in Thailand,
mists believe that to truly reflect the govern-
15.5% in both China and Malaysia, 13.3% in
ment budget situation, the receipts from selling
Philippines, 11.8% in Indonesia and only 7.3%
in India. Except for 2009 when the govern- assets should not be counted in the annual
ment implemented a series of tax cuts and budget balance. These returns are included by
exemptions to stimulate aggregate demand, the government since they reduce the severity
Vietnam’s taxes and fees to GDP ratio has no of the budget deficit implied by the numbers
tendency to fall. The preliminary estimate in reported. In fact, this situation is similar to a
2010 and projection in 2011 showed that this person selling his or her property to finance
ratio remains high, at around 23% GDP. This spending. The debt may decrease but his or her
implied that, in addition to paying a high infla- stock of assets also falls proportionally. In
tion tax of over 10% each year, overall other words, the person becomes less wealthy.
Journal of Economics and Development 12 Vol. 13, No.3, December 2011
Figure 3: Total Tax Revenue/GDP: An International Comparison
Source: ADB
Figure 4: Revenue Decomposition
Source: Annual State Budget Statements and Projections (MoF)
Journal of Economics and Development 13 Vol. 13, No.3, December 2011
Box 1: Inflation Tax
Government often opts for different management tools were most severely
methods to finance its budget deficit, rang- affected.
ing from increasing taxes, borrowing, to In Vietnam, food and food–related prices
printing new money. In the case of increas- always go up faster than others. Meanwhile,
ing money supply, it will consequently lead spending on these items accounts for a large
to rising prices of goods and services in the proportion in the budget of those with a
economy. lower income. Accordingly, inflation tax,
The price increase, in this situation, is although reducing government’s debt bur-
deemed to be a hidden tax. Suppose that den, relatively transfers income from the
prices increase by 10%, diminishing the poor to the rich, broadening the gap
purchasing power of money. The effect of between them.
this action is as if government imposes a
10% tax on its citizens’ income. Given that the current public debt exceeds
Accordingly, inflation caused by printing USD 50 billion and is rising as the govern-
new money to finance spending is called ment continues to run a budget deficit, infla-
inflation tax. tion tax is still considered one of the major
tools to reduce public debt burden.
Although both inflation and income tax
Advancing next year’s budget revenue for
reduce people’s real income, the former is
the current year’s spending and buying back
less noticed and less opposed by the citizens
than the latter. Therefore, many govern- government bnds by the State Bank of
ments are tempted to go with inflation tax, Vietnam are the two channels causing money
especially when central banks are not inde- supply and inflation to increase rapidly.
pendent. The burden of inflation tax falls Inflation tax can be avoided by commit-
mostly on money holders or on those who ting to a balanced annual budget, and this
have fixed income. Normally, people with can only be achieved by adopting a strict and
low and lower middle income lacking risk long-term oriented spending cut program.
Figure B2. Money Supply, Domestic Borrowing and Inflation, 2000 – 2010
Source: ADB and] GSO
Journal of Economics and Development 14 Vol. 13, No.3, December 2011
Decomposing total revenue by different sec- become very high compared to its neighbors;
tors in the last five years shows that, on aver- chances to raise revenue seem very small
age, state owned enterprises (SOEs), although while many revenue sources are unsustainable
large, contributed only 17% of total revenue and may slump or disappear in the coming
and the figure only improved slightly over the years. Efforts to restrain and gradually elimi-
years. Revenue from foreign invested enter- nate deficits hence depend strongly on tighten-
prises, excluding crude oil, and that from non- ing public spending, a task which probably
state enterprises made up around 10% of the requires a comprehensive budgetary reform
total. Meanwhile, crude oil and others occu- and economic restructuring.
pied respectively 20% and 42% of the total 5. Interest rate and exchange rate risks
budget revenue in the last five years. Notably,
From 2000 to 2007, Vietnam arose as one of
revenue from crude oil decreased from 29% in
the fastest growing and most stable economies
2006 to only about 13% in 2010. However,
in the region. According to the ADB statistics,
returns from crude oil are similar to income
Vietnam’s economic growth averaged at 7.6%
from selling national assets. On the one hand,
per annum while inflation and budget deficit to
it helps relieve current budget deficit. On the
GDP ratio stayed low at around 4.6% and
other hand, it reduces state owned assets.
1.6% respectively over this period. Being a
Moreover, the earnings are unsustainable since
low-income country coupled with its econom-
resources are limited and depletable.
ic achievements, Vietnam subsequently bene-
In addition, we also believe that to evaluate fited from preferential loans with low interest
precisely the country’s budgetary status, future rates from international organizations. Both
obligations must be considered. One of the onshore and offshore investors had no doubt in
most important obligations in annual budget the country’s debt repayment capacity. During
expenditure is pension and social subsidies. this time, local government bond rates stood at
Part of employees’ income is currently being far below 10%. Meanwhile, the External Debt
extracted in the form of social insurance. In Report No. 7 by the MoF showed that, by 31st
essence, this resembles government’s borrow- December 2010, up to 80% of Vietnam gov-
ing from workers, and government’s duty to ernment’s foreign loans had preferential fixed
pay future pension is no different from paying interest rates under 3%. Since the report did
its debt. During the last five years, pension and not specify the interest rate for each loan, the
social subsidies in Vietnam increased by more effective interest rate could not accurately be
than three times, from about VND 22 trillion determined. Alternatively, this rate would be
(8.25% of total budget expenditure) in 2006 to approximated based on the bands of interest
nearly VND 71 trillion (12.2% of total budget rates reported. A simple calculation indicates
expenditure) in 2010. The burden of these pay- that the effective interest rate of Vietnam’s for-
ments is forecasted to increase sharply because eign debt is approximately 1.54-3.75%, around
of the fast growing number of retirees in the one-third of that of domestic debt of 9.45%.
coming years, especially when the Vietnam’s This reflects that the burden on external debt
currently golden aged population ages. service is quite small. The report, however,
According to a recent forecast of the Institute also showed that the size of commercial loans
of Labor Science and Social Affairs (ILSSA), with increasing interest rates had tended to go
the number of pensioners in Vietnam in 2020 up. By the end of 2010, nearly 6.8% of the
will rise by over 2.5 times as compared with total external public debt had interest rates
2010. from 6% to 10% and more than 7.0% of the
The revenue analysis above shows that total external public debt had floating interest
Vietnam’s revenue to GDP ratio has already rates.
Journal of Economics and Development 15 Vol. 13, No.3, December 2011
After many years, Vietnam’s economy that fluctuations. A depreciation of the Dong would
leaned much on quantity instead of quality has create a higher external debt burden in terms of
revealed its weakness as economic growth local currency. The External Debt Report No.
started to slow down while the Dong continued 7 also showed a rigid structure of external debt
to depreciate. In the aftermath of the global by currencies over time. By the end of 2010,
economic crisis, the risk of a sovereign default Vietnam’s external public debt comprised
by some European governments worries the mainly of hard currencies including Japanese
international community. Investors are con- yen - JPY (38.8%), Special Drawing Rights -
cerned over the debt repayment ability of those SDR (27.1%), USD (22.2%), and EUR
countries with high public debt and persistent (9.2%). Debt in other currencies only made up
budget deficits. During the last three years, less than 3% of the total. Classifying by credi-
Fitch Ratings, an international credit rating tors, Japan was the biggest lender (34.3%), fol-
agency, downgraded Vietnam twice, to BB- in lowed by the International Development
May 2008 and to B in July 2010. It also Association - IDA (24.9%) and the ADB
warned the country of its economic and finan- (15.0%). The U.S and EU countries accounted
cial instabilities. High growth of M2 and cred- for only 0.3% and 6.9% of Vietnam’s total
it in many consecutive years results in a high external public debt respectively, but the pro-
proportion of non-performing loans. portion of debt in the currencies of these coun-
According to the ADB and the IMF, on aver- tries was very large. This demonstrates that
age from 2000 to 2010, Vietnam’s M2 and lenders tend to use hard currencies.
credit growth hit a record highs of approxi- Consequently Vietnam was exposed more to
mately 30% and 33% respectively. Therefore, exchange rate risks as these currencies normal-
in addition to becoming a lower middle- ly appreciated against the Dong over time.
income country, Vietnam is expected to find it In more detail, from the beginning of 2010 to
hard to access preferential external loans in the the end of second quarter of 2011, some main
future. currencies including EUR, USD, and JPY have
In spite of the low cost, Vietnam’s external appreciated by around 12%, 13%, and 26%
public debt conveys high risk of exchange rate against the Dong respectively. This implies that
Figure 5: External Public Debt by Interest Rates
Source: The External Debt Report No.7 (MoF)
Journal of Economics and Development 16 Vol. 13, No.3, December 2011
foreign public debt in terms of local currency public debt. The result shows that the Dong
has greatly risen and puts more pressure on fis- effectively depreciated by 41% from 2002 to
cal deficit and monetary policies. To have a bet- 2010. However, the real value of the debt
ter overview of exchange rate risks on external dropped as Vietnam’s inflation rocketed by
public debt, we calculated the nominal effective 110% in the same period, implying the burden
exchange rate (NEER) of the Dong against a of the debt has been shared to the public through
basket of other currencies in Vietnam’s external inflation tax.
Figure 6: Effective Interest Rates on External Public Debt
Source: The External Debt Report No.7 (MoF)
Figure 7: External Public Debt by Currencies by 12/2010
Source: External Debt Report No.7 (MoF)
Journal of Economics and Development 17 Vol. 13, No.3, December 2011
Box 2. Nominal Effective Exchange Rate
The nominal effective exchange rate wi is the weight of the foreign currency i
(NEER) is used to determine an increase or and n is the number of foreign currencies in
decrease in relative value of a country’s cur- the debt basket.
rency to a basket of others. Here the NEER
is measured by computing the weighted An increase in the NEER indicates the
average value of the home currency against Dong is appreciating while a decrease
foreign currencies in the external debt bas- means the Dong is depreciating against
ket of Vietnam. More specifically, it is cal- other 18 foreign currencies in Vietnam’s
culated as follows. external public debt basket. A fall in the
NEER also implies a rising burden of
in which, e is the nominal exchange rate Vietnam’s foreign debt. The NEER in the
period of 2002-2010 is calculated and pre-
of VND against USD; ei is the exchange
rate of the currency i against the US dollar; sented in Figure B3.
Figure B3: Nominal Effective Exchange Rate (NEER) and CPI (2002 = 100)
Source: The author’s calculation from MoF and GSO data
Journal of Economics and Development 18 Vol. 13, No.3, December 2011
6. Public debt prospects 2011-2020 to minimize the risk of a financial crisis. In
Budget deficit and public debt sometimes order to do so, public spending cuts must be
are necessary for a country, especially for made thoroughly to ensure that public debt
those developing countries with high demand grows at a lower rate than the economy. This
for infrastructure investment or in need of a means that the debt should not grow faster than
stimulus package to counter a cyclical down-
turn caused by external shocks. However, per- its income.
sistent budget deficit and rapidly increased To predict the future of public debt, we gen-
public debt not only lead to sovereign default erate various scenarios of the public debt to
risks but also affect negatively macro-econom- GDP ratio under different assumptions on
ic stability or prosperity of a country in the budget deficit, bond rate, exchange rates, and
long term.
inflation in Vietnam from now to 2020. By
With an average domestic savings rate of
definition, public debt is the accumulation of
about 28% of GDP while national investment
accounting for approximately 36% of GDP, deficits in the past and present. Assuming that
Vietnam public debt increased quickly in the there is no money printing, government must
last 10 years. Borrowing may temporarily help borrow to finance budget deficit, resulting in
increase total investment but eventually princi- new debts. Thus, a change in current public
pals and interests must be repaid in the future. debt is calculated as follows.
Put simply, the larger the debt today, the more
will be paid tomorrow. (1)
Prolonged budget deficit and borrowing in which, D is total public debt, G is total
also creates more pressure on inflation, espe- government spending, T is total revenue, rD is
cially when the central bank has no independ- interest payments. Dividing both sides of
ence. In principle, to finance budget deficit, equation (1) by nominal gross domestic prod-
the government can choose to raise taxes
uct, Y, yields:
and/or to borrow. The ability to increase
Vietnam’s government revenue seems to be (2)
limited because the mobilization rate is
already among the highest levels in the region Finally, noticing that ∆D/Y =
and many revenue sources are unsustainable. ∆(D/Y)+(∆Y/Y)(D/Y), we obtain the expres-
Borrowing via issuing bonds, on the one hand, sion reflecting the change in public debt to
would push up the interest rate and hence GDP ratio over time as follows.
crowd out private investment. On the other
hand, it would loosen money supply if issued (3)
bonds are repurchased via the discount win-
dow and open market operations. in which, g = ∆Y/Y is nominal GDP growth
Statistics also show a high correlation rate. All variables in Equation (3) are
between budget deficit and inflation in devel- expressed in nominal terms. The equation can
oping countries. High inflation is considered
the root of the distrust in the local currency, be interpreted as follows. Public debt to GDP
causing dollarization and volatility of foreign ratio will increase if either government runs a
exchange rates. primary budget deficit, (G - T), and/or the
Vietnam should be prudent and more interest rate is higher than nominal GDP
responsible with its budget spending decisions growth.
Journal of Economics and Development 19 Vol. 13, No.3, December 2011
Box 3. Vinashin story and lessons for state owned conglomerates
Vietnam Shipbuilding Industry Suisse. Within five years, Vinashin also
Corporation (VSIC) was established on received a significant amount of land to
31st Jan 1996 by consolidating all ship- develop their projects and then used them as
building enterprises throughout the country. collateral to borrow from domestic banks.
The company’s main objective is to develop However, instead of focusing on its core
the shipbuilding industry with advanced business, Vinashin quickly spread invest-
and modern technology, and to become a ment into other areas in which they had lit-
leading industry of the nation. tle experience, ranging from financial
On 15th May 2006, the Prime Minister investment, mining, construction, etc. to
issued Decision No. 103 and 104/QĐ-TTg automobile shop, resorts, and even pig
on setting up an experimental Vinashin farms. Adventurous projects made
Group based on reorganizing VSIC for Vinashin’s debts grow rapidly and the group
diversified businesses. In particular, ship suffered losses. Lax supervision from high-
building & repairing and maritime transport er levels and poor management of the
are its core business, closely linked to sci- group’s leaders resulted in a series of ineffi-
ence and technology, research & develop- cient and incorrect capital uses such as bor-
ment. rowing to repay old debt, using short-term
With the government’s support, Vinashin loans to support long-term debt, and even
rapidly developed and was expected to using working capital to invest.
become one of the largest ship building and The global crisis in 2008-2009 did cause
maritime transport corporations in the a severe hit on unhealthy financial condi-
region and over the world. During the peri- tions at Vinashin. Demand for shipbuilding
od of 1996-2006, by utilizing skilled work- and shipping in the world plunged and
ers and engineers in the field, Vinashin con- Vinashin was not insulated from this. In
stantly achieved a growth rate of return 2008 alone, customers canceled contracts
from 35% to 40% per year. By 2010, worth USD 8 billion with Vinashin.
Vinashin had a network of hundreds of cor- However, the group kept hiding its losses
porations, subsidiaries, joint ventures and and reported profits in 2009 and in the first
associates. The total number of employees quarter of 2010. By June 2010, although
at Vinashin was once about 70,000 and Vinashin’s total assets were estimated to be
accounted for more than 1.5% of Vietnam’s VND 104 trillion (USD 5.4 billion), its debt
workforce. went up to VND 86 trillion (USD 4.5 bil-
Among state owned conglomerates, lion).
Vinashin received more financial favors In December 2010, Vinashin officially
from government. In 2005, the group was defaulted on the first installment, worth
given USD 750 million funded by govern- USD 60 million of the USD600 million
ment bonds issued in international markets debt issued in 2007 to international credi-
with a yield rate of 7.125% per annum. In tors. Credit rating agencies such as Moody
2007, the group was also permitted to issue immediately downgraded the rating of
USD 600 million of bonds in international Vietnam and its state owned corporations.
markets under the arrangement of the Credit Consequently, Vietnam Electricity,
Journal of Economics and Development 20 Vol. 13, No.3, December 2011
PetroVietnam and Vinacomin were forced profits after taxes to invest in what they
to postpone or cancel their plans to issue want. Many enterprises, especially those
bonds in international markets after the operating in natural resources mining with
event. high return such as PetroVietnam and
In August 2010, the Vietnamese govern- Vinacomin are also making investments out
ment established a committee to begin of their core business without being con-
restructuring the failing Vinashin. trolled.
Subsidiaries that were not in shipbuilding Debt and losses of Vinashin as well as
were transferred to other state owned enter- other state owned groups and corporations
prises. A “new” Vinashin will focus on the are raising alarm about the effectiveness
core businesses of shipbuilding, repairing and lax supervision in this sector.
and supporting industry. However, whether Recent statistics show that total public
or not the group will be able to repay its investment, apart from being funded
debt in the coming years remains question- through state budget allocation and borrow-
able. ing, was also largely financed by state-
Behind the consequences and lessons owned enterprises’ retained profits and
from Vinashin are concerns about the effec- state-owned assets. On average, it account-
tiveness and financial health of other state ed for 24-30% of the total investment.
owned corporations. The current financial Cutting public investment probably has to
mechanism allows these entities to retain start from these figures.
To forecast public debt, according to rized as follows.
Equation (3), we have to predict primary budg- Economic growth will help increase nation-
et deficit and nominal GDP growth rate over al income, therefore reducing the D/Y ratio. In
the years. Firstly, the component (G - T) is return, economic growth in any given year
equal to overall deficit minus interest pay- depends partly on budget deficit. If govern-
ments. Primary budget deficit is determined ment increases spending or lowers taxes to
based on its own historical data and fiscal pol- stimulate growth, D/Y may fall if Y increases
icy orientations in the future. Interest pay- or may increase if budget deficit is higher. In
ments on external public debt are provided in the benchmark scenario, the economic growth
the External Debt Report No.7 by the MoF is assumed to be at 6% per annum during the
while interest payments on domestic public period 2011-2020.
debt are estimated based on outstanding gov- Inflation is a hidden tax. It can help reduce
ernment bonds in the domestic market. D/Y ratio as it enhances nominal GDP.
Secondly, estimates of nominal GDP growth However, it should be noticed that inflation
rate are based on different scenarios of real erodes the burden of debt in domestic curren-
GDP growth and inflation in the economy in cy only. For external debt, the burden might
the period 2011-2020. increase as inflation will triggers depreciation
We simulate D/Y using different assump- of the Dong. Besides, inflation is greatly driv-
tions about macroeconomic environment. The en by money supply growth, which is in turn
impacts and assumptions of some key vari- strongly related to budget deficit. In the bench-
ables in the benchmark scenario are summa- mark scenario, except for 2011 when inflation
Journal of Economics and Development 21 Vol. 13, No.3, December 2011
is expected to be about 18%, we assume that all budget deficit reported by the ADB
Vietnam’s inflation will stand at 6% per year accounted for 7.71% of GDP and interest pay-
from 2012 to 2020. ments estimated from the state budget state-
Exchange rates are closely related to D/Y ment was around 1.42% of GDP. Therefore,
because they affect the burden of external pub- primary deficit in that year equaled 6.29%
lic debt. A devaluation of domestic currency GDP. The corresponding estimated number in
has an important impact on D/Y ratio as exter- 2010 stood at around 4.5% GDP. Primary
nal public debt accounted for two thirds of budget deficit will be accumulated to current
Vietnam’s total public debt. In the benchmark public debt. In the benchmark scenario, we
scenario, in the period 2011-2020, the Dong is assume that Vietnam will manage to maintain
assumed to depreciate by 5% per year against its primary budget deficit to GDP ratio at 2.5%
the U.S. dollar. per year during 2011-2020. To achieve this
Interest is the cost of borrowing. The greater rate, austerity must of course be followed with
the interest rate is, the larger the budget deficit a long-term commitment.
remains and so does the public debt. Interest Lastly, external public debt to domestic
on domestic debt can be calculated based on public debt ratio is assumed to remain at the
detailed information about the amount and present level of around 2:1. Interest rates of
coupon rate of outstanding government bonds public debt in domestic and foreign currencies
and government guaranteed bonds. Annual will stand at 10% and 5%, respectively.
interest payments on foreign public debt are Forecasts for overall budget deficit and pub-
extracted from the External Debt Report No.7. lic debt in the benchmark scenario are present-
Primary budget deficit is calculated by sub- ed in Figure 8. This scenario implies that pub-
tracting interest payments from overall budget lic spending should be drastically constrained
deficit. For example, in 2009, Vietnam’s over- to bring down overall budget deficit from
Figure 8: Forecasts on Budget Deficit and Public Debt in 2011-2020
Source: ADB and the author’s calculation
Journal of Economics and Development 22 Vol. 13, No.3, December 2011
7.7% in 2009 to 4.3% in 2011, 3.2% in 2015, More noticeably, if primary budget deficit to
and 2.9% of GDP in 2020. Accordingly, public GDP ratio increases by one percentage point
debt will temporarily halt in 2011 due to from the benchmark scenario, it will cause
hyperinflation (about 18%). However, in the overall budget deficit to GDP ratio to rise by
following years, public debt to GDP ratio will 1.0 percentage points per year, and public debt
rise steadily to 65.5% in 2015 and then 81.7% will reach 91.5% of GDP in 2020. Even if the
in 2020. government succeeds to maintain its annual
We also simulate budget deficit and public primary budget balanced, an overall budget
debt in different scenarios. The results show deficit may still occur because of interest pay-
that, ceteris paribus, every percentage point ments and domestic currency depreciation. In
increase/decrease in inflation or GDP growth this scenario, public debt will remain at
from the benchmark scenario would approximately 55% of GDP in 2020, a circum-
decrease/increase overall budget deficit to stance that will never happen given the current
GDP ratio by approximately 0.65 percentage levels of government revenue and expenditure.
points per year. As a result, public debt to GDP
ratio would decrease/increase by about 6.5 The prospects of Vietnam’s public debt con-
percentage points by 2020. Similarly, for every vey a clear message. In order to maintain a sta-
percentage point increase in the home curren- ble public debt to GDP ratio, besides triggering
cy depreciation from the benchmark situation, high inflation, the government must be able to
overall budget deficit to GDP ratio would control a balanced primary budget. Given the
increase by 0.4 percentage points each year country’s current high level of revenue to GDP
and consequently, public debt to GDP ratio ratio, the job can only be done through public
will go up to 85.6% in 2020. spending contraction.
References
ADB (2010), Key Indicators for Asia and The Pacific, Asian Development Bank.
Catão L. and Sutton B. (2002), ‘Sovereign Defaults the Role of Volatility’, IMF Working Paper No.
02/149.
IMF Country Report: Vietnam Statistical Appendix, 2003, 2007, and 2010.
International Monetary Fund (2010), World Economic Outlook Database.
Li Y., Olivares-Caminal R., and Panizza U., (2010), ‘Avoiding Avoidable Debt Crises: Lessons from
Recent Defaults’, in the book Sovereign Debt and the Financial Crisis: Will This Time Be Different?
by Carlos A. Primo Braga and Gallina A. Vincelette (2010), World Bank.
Manasse P. and Roubini N. (2005), ‘Rules of Thumb for Sovereign Debt Crises’, IMF working paper No.
05/42.
Ministry of Finance (2010), External Debt Report No. 7.
Reinhart, C. M. (2002), ‘Default, Currency Crises and Sovereign Credit Ratings’, NBER Working Paper
8738;
Ministry of Finance, State Budget Statements and Projections (2003 – 2011), Publishing House of
Finance, Hanoi.
Vũ Tuấn Anh (2010), ‘A summary on Vietnam’s public investment in the last ten years’, Vietnam Institute
of Economics.
Journal of Economics and Development 23 Vol. 13, No.3, December 2011
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